University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

July 2021

HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS’ INVESTMENT DECISIONS?
Yushi Tian
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Tian, Yushi, "HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS’ INVESTMENT
DECISIONS?" (2021). Doctoral Dissertations. 2227.
https://doi.org/10.7275/22487458.0 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/2227

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS’ INVESTMENT DECISIONS?
Yushi Tian

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Accounting Commons

HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS’
INVESTMENT DECISIONS?

A Dissertation Presented
By
YUSHI TIAN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2021
Management

i

© Copyright 2021 Yushi Tian
All Rights Reserved

ii

HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS’
INVESTMENT DECISIONS?

A Dissertation Presented
By
Yushi Tian

Approved as to style and content by:
________________________________________
Christopher P. Agoglia, Co-Chair
________________________________________
Elaine (Ying) Wang, Co-Chair
________________________________________
Yoon Ju Kang, Member
________________________________________
Andrew Lind Cohen, Outside Member

________________________________________
George R. Milne, Ph.D. Program Director
Isenberg School of Management

iii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my husband Longhao.
Thank you for your love, support, and encouragement.
I am so grateful to have you by my side.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank my dissertation co-chairs, Chris and Elaine. It has been an
invaluable experience working with both of you. Thank you for your feedback and guidance on
this project. I have learned so much through this process. Chris, I cannot begin to express how
much I appreciate your support and encouragement throughout this year’s job market. Your
mentorship has meant so much to me. Elaine, I am so glad that I was assigned as your research
assistant from day one. Thank you for all the time you have spent training me and providing me
direction. I am truly grateful for all your help and kindness.
To my dissertation committee members, Yoon Ju and Andrew. Thank you both for your
helpful feedback. Yoon Ju, thank you so much for your support throughout the PhD program. I
am constantly touched by your encouragement and kind words. While I was taking your audit
class seven years ago, I had no idea I would have the opportunity to join you at UMass. It has
been a real pleasure getting to know you better. Andrew, thank you for being so generous with
your time and providing great guidance on this project. I really appreciate your insightful
perspectives on both the theory and statistics.
Next, I would like to thank my fellow UMass Ph.D. students. To Kyle, you are the best
cohort anyone could ever ask for. I am so grateful that we got to go through the PhD program
together. I have learned so much from you, not only how to be a good researcher, but also how to
be a good friend, team player, and responsible adult. You have made this journey so much more
fun! To Scott, my job market buddy, thank you for your encouragement and kindness throughout
this process. This year’s job market was not fun, but I am so grateful that I had a good friend to
go through it with. To Steve, Jeff, Mary Kate, Jess, Jenny, Matt, Nikki, and Chez, who graduated
before me, I appreciate your examples and continued support. Thank you for all of your help and

v

encouragement over the years. To Aubrey, Conner, Cody, Sarah, Hanxu, Zach and Luke, it has
been a pleasure getting to know you all. I will for sure miss our lunches and discussions. A
special thank you to my friends Nikki, Aubrey and Conner, thank you for your friendship and
support, especially through my dissertation and job market days. It really means a lot to me!
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends. To my parents, thank you for encouraging
me to pursue my doctoral degree. I am grateful to have you two as my parents. To my in-laws,
thank you for your continued support through this whole process. To my dear friend Yilin, thank
you for being there for me whenever I need to talk and for always being able to understand me.
To my husband Longhao, I am so grateful to have you in my life. Your warm hug and good
cooking have always been my great comfort. Thank you for holding my hand through my highs
and lows.

vi

ABSTRACT
HOW DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS’
INVESTMENT DECISIONS?

MAY 2021

YUSHI TIAN, B.S., BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY
M.S., LEHIGH UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Co-Directed by: Professor Christopher P. Agoglia and Elaine (Ying) Wang

Shareholder voting is an important way for investors to participate in corporate governance. In
this study, I examine, as individual investors participate in shareholder voting, whether and how
their investment decision is affected by the consistency between their own vote and
management’s final decision on the voting issue (i.e., opinion consistency) and whether
management’ final decision aligns with the majority or minority of investors (i.e., management
position). Using ego-defensiveness theory and majority effect, I predict and find that when
investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, they make more positive investment
decisions if management’s final decision on the voting issue is consistent (versus inconsistent)
with their own vote, and this effect is stronger when management aligns with the minority of
investors, compared to when management aligns with the majority of investors. In contrast, when
investors have weaker opinions on the voting issue, they make more positive investment
decisions when management aligns with the majority of investors (versus aligns with the
minority of investors), regardless of whether management’s final decision is consistent with their
own vote. My study improves our understanding on the role of investor voting in forming
investors’ investment decisions, and has practical implications for regulators, company
management, and individual investors.
Keywords: shareholder voting; ego-defensiveness; herding theory; majority effect; individual
investor
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Shareholder voting is an important way for investors to participate in corporate
governance. With voting, investors express their opinions and exercise their rights. Individual
investors own approximately 30% of publicly traded companies (Fisch, 2017; Society for
Corporate Governance, 2018). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been
continually working to ensure individual investors have access to more transparent, accurate, and
complete information in order for them to make informed voting decisions (SEC, 2020). Despite
the importance of individual investors and the SEC’s promotion of shareholder voting among
individual investors, the impact of shareholder voting on individual investors’ investment
decisions is unknown. In this study, I investigate whether and how participating in shareholder
voting affects individual investors’ perceptions of a company’s management and their
investment decisions. Specifically, I examine how the consistency between investors’ own vote
and management’s final decision on the voting issue (i.e., opinion consistency) and whether
management’s final decision aligns with the majority or minority of investors (i.e., management
position) affect individual investors’ investment willingness, and how such effects vary with
investors’ strength of opinion regarding a voting issue.1
The joint effect of opinion consistency, management position, and strength of opinion on
investors’ judgments is important to understand. When an individual investor participates in
shareholder voting, management’s final decision can either be consistent or inconsistent with this
investor’s own vote. However, whether investors should change their investment decisions based
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I design my study in a setting of non-binding voting, where management can choose to either align with the
majority of investors or align with the minority of investors.
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on opinion consistency between their own vote and management’s final decision is an empirical
question. For example, if opinion consistency influences their perceptions of management
credibility, investors’ change in investment decisions may be well justified. In contrast, if
opinion consistency does not change investors’ assessment of a company and its management,
the resulting change in investment decision may not be desired, especially when the change is a
result of affective responses from investors’ defensiveness of their own opinions (De Dreu and
van Knippenberg, 2005). While regulators have been encouraging individual investors to take
more active roles in voting (SEC, 2020), it is important to understand whether such voting will
unexpectedly change investors’ affect toward management and their subsequent investment
decisions.
The effect of opinion consistency is likely contingent on management position. In recent
years, it has become increasingly common for companies to hold non-binding voting (Levit and
Malenko, 2011). In non-binding shareholder voting, management maintains the authority to
make the final decision on the voting issue. As a result, management’s final decision can be
either aligned with the majority of investors or aligned with the minority of investors.2 When
management aligns with the minority and goes against the majority, investors will likely have
stronger reactions to the consistency between management’s final decision and their own vote
(Jones and Wein, 1972), which will lead to a larger change in investment decisions, compared to
when management aligns with the majority of investors.
Further, the joint effect of opinion consistency and management position could vary with
investors’ strength of opinion of a voting issue. Among all the voting issues companies propose,
some issues may elicit stronger opinions from investors than others. While investors may be
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In practice, it is common for the company management to align with either the majority or minority of investors
when the vote is non-binding.
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defensive when they have stronger opinions, they may not at all be defensive and are willing to
go along with the majority (i.e., herd) when they have weaker opinions. Therefore, I examine the
following questions in my study: (1) whether opinion consistency affects investment decisions;
(2) whether management’s position to go against majority will exaggerate such an effect of
opinion consistency; and (3) how the joint effect of opinion consistency and management
position is moderated by investors’ strength of opinion.
Psychology literature shows that when people have stronger opinions, they perceive these
opinions as part of their extended self-concept (De Dreu and van Knippenberg, 2005), and can
therefore be defensive about them. When others agree with their opinions, they will feel affirmed
and thus develop positive affect toward others who hold similar opinions (Buckley, Winkel, and
Leary, 2004). In contrast, when others disagree with their opinions, they will feel disaffirmed and
thus develop negative affect toward others who hold different opinions. Therefore, I predict that
when investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, the consistent (inconsistent) opinion
between investors’ own vote and management’s final decision on the voting issue will make
investors feel affirmed (disaffirmed) and lead them to develop positive (negative) affect toward
management, which will in turn increase (decrease) their investment willingness. In addition, I
predict that when management’s final decision goes against the majority and aligns with the
minority of investors, it violates investors’ general expectation that management will go with the
majority vote. Such expectation violation will exaggerate the effect of opinion consistency on
investors’ investment decision (Jones and Wein, 1972).
In contrast, when investors have weaker opinions on voting issues, they do not perceive
their opinions as part of their extended self-concept and are not defensive about them. Therefore,
opinion consistency does not affect investment willingness. Instead, when people have weaker
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opinions, they may tend to think the majority are more likely to hold the right opinion (Welch,
2000; Nowak, Szamrej, and Latane, 1990; Moussaid, Kammer, Analytis, and Neth, 2013).
Therefore, when investors have weaker opinions on the voting issue, they will think the majority
of investors are more likely to be right, so they are likely to care more about whether
management’s final decision aligns with the majority of investors, regardless of whether
management’s final decision is consistent with their own vote. When management aligns with
the majority (minority) of investors, investors will think management has made the right (wrong)
decision, and therefore perceive management as more (less) credible, which will then increase
(decrease) investment willingness.
To test my predictions, I conduct a 2  2  2 between-participants experiment with
Opinion Consistency (management’s final decision is consistent versus inconsistent with the
investor’s own vote), Management Position (management’s final decision aligns with the
majority versus minority of investors), and Strength of Opinion (investors’ opinion on the voting
issue is stronger versus weaker) as independent variables. In the experiment, participants assume
the role of an individual investor of a hypothetical company and are presented with a voting
proposal. The proposal is either whether the company should update its supply chain to conflictfree minerals only (which investors tend to have stronger opinions about), or whether the
company should build on-site solar panels instead of purchasing green energy from power
companies (which investors tend to have weaker opinions about). After casting their votes,
participants are informed about the voting outcome and management’s final decision on the
voting issue, where they find out whether management’s final decision is consistent or
inconsistent with their own vote and whether management chooses to align with the majority or
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the minority of investors. Investors are then asked to indicate whether they would like to
increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in the company.
I find that, when investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, opinion
consistency will affect investors’ sense of affirmation and their affect toward management, and
thus influence their investment willingness. Also, such an effect of opinion consistency is
stronger when management aligns with the minority of investors, compared to when
management aligns with the majority of investors. When investors have weaker opinions on the
voting issue, investors perceive management as more credible when management’s final decision
aligns with the majority of investors, compared to when management’s final decision aligns with
the minority of investors. Therefore, investors increase their investment when management
aligns with the majority (versus minority) of investors, regardless of whether management’s final
decision is consistent with their own vote.
My findings are important for regulators to understand. I document an unanticipated joint
effect of opinion consistency and management position on investment willingness, when
investors have stronger opinions on voting issues. While the SEC has been making rules to
ensure individual investors to have access to more transparent and reliable voting information,
and has also been encouraging individual investors to participate in shareholder voting (SEC,
2020), my results suggest that investors will change their investment willingness based on
whether management’s final decision is consistent or inconsistent with their own vote, especially
when management goes against majority and aligns with minority. More importantly, my
mediation analysis shows that such decisions are driven by the sense of affirmation and affect,
rather than decision-relevant assessment (e.g., management credibility).

5

In contrast, when investors have weaker opinions on voting issues, they tend to herd with
the majority of investors and are not defensive about their own opinions. While my mediation
analysis suggests that such a herding behavior influences investment willingness because it does
change investors’ perceptions of management credibility, it also suggests that management’s
final decision on voting issues will influence investors’ investment decisions differently
depending on whether investors have stronger versus weaker opinions. These findings add to the
literature by demonstrating how shareholder voting influences individual investors’ investment
decisions, whereas most archival literature focuses on how shareholder voting affects subsequent
reporting quality and firm performance (e.g., Dao, Raghunandan, and Rama, 2012; Barua,
Raghunandan, and Rama, 2017; Kimbro and Xu, 2016).
The remainder of my paper is organized as follows. Section II includes background and
hypothesis development, Section III describes the research method, and Section IV reports the
experiment results. Finally, Section V concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Shareholder Voting
One of the major ways for investors to participate in corporate governance is shareholder
voting. Through shareholder voting, investors can learn about the matters to be decided and
make their views known to company management. Current accounting literature has archivally
demonstrated that shareholder voting influences reporting quality and firm performance. For
example, Dao, Raghunandan, and Rama (2012) find that firms with shareholder voting on
auditor selection are less likely to have subsequent restatements and have lower abnormal
accruals. Kimbro and Xu (2016) show that firms with higher percentage of approval votes on
executive compensation have better accounting quality, performance, and returns than firms with
lower percentage of approval votes on executive compensation. Similarly, Barua, Raghunandan,
and Rama (2017) find that subsequent auditor dismissals become more likely with increases in
the proportion of shareholders not ratifying the auditor. While prior studies examine how
shareholder voting affects firm-level performance, my study examines how shareholder voting
influences individual investors’ own investment decisions. Below, I first discuss how opinion
consistency and management position jointly affect investment willingness when investors have
stronger opinions on voting issues, and then discuss the joint effect of opinion consistency and
management position on investment willingness when investors have weaker opinions on voting
issues.
2.2. Stronger Opinion and Ego-defensiveness
When individual investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, I predict that their
investment decisions will be affected by whether management’s final decision is consistent or
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inconsistent with their own vote. Psychology literature shows that people tend to be defensive
about their own opinions. Specifically, De Dreu and van Knippenberg (2005) find that people
develop ownership of their arguments and make these arguments part of their self-concept.
Because people desire a positive view of themselves (i.e., ego-defensiveness), they value the
arguments they are associated with and are defensive about them. Along the same lines, Pingree
(2007) argues that expressing one’s opinion can make the person more committed to this opinion
and ego-involvement can thus lead to strong reactions to disagreement, especially about
important matters. When others agree with their opinions, people will feel affirmed and such
affirmation serves their ego-defensiveness function. This will then lead people to develop
positive affect toward others who hold similar opinions. In contrast, when others disagree with
their opinions, they will feel disaffirmed and thus develop negative affect toward those with
different opinions. As shown in Buckley, Winkel, and Leary (2004), when being confirmed,
people have positive emotional reactions. In contrast, when they feel disaffirmed or rejected,
people will have negative emotional reactions.
When individual investors participate in shareholder voting, their votes are their
expressed opinions. Therefore, when management’s final decision on the voting issue is
consistent with an investor’s vote, the investor will feel affirmed by management and thus
develop positive affect toward management because their ego-defensiveness function is served.
In contrast, when management’s final decision on the voting issue is inconsistent with an
investor’s vote, the investor will feel disaffirmed and thus develop negative affect toward
management. I predict that investors’ positive (negative) affect toward management will then
increase (decrease) their investment willingness.
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Since advisory voting does not require management of the company to follow the
majority of investors, management maintains the final decision-making power. That is, when
they make the final decision on the voting issue, management can either choose to align with the
vote of the majority of investors or align with the vote of the minority of investors (Brownstein
and Kirman, 2004). In general, people tend to have the expectation that opinions held by the
minority are less likely to be recognized, positively evaluated, or acted upon (Farh et al., 2020).
Therefore, the general expectation is that management will go with the majority of investors.
When management’s final decision is against the majority of investors and instead aligns with
the minority, investors’ expectations are violated. Jones and Wein (1972) find that expectation
violation can make the effect of opinion similarity stronger. Specifically, they find that people
are gratified to receive agreement from dissimilar others and very disappointed when a similar
other disagrees with them. Their findings show that when people receive unexpected agreement
or disagreement, they will have stronger reactions compared to when such agreement or
disagreement is expected. As a result, I predict that when management aligns with the minority
of investors, opinion consistency will cause individual investors to have a stronger sense of
affirmation/disaffirmation and stronger positive/negative affect toward management compared to
when management aligns with the majority of investors.
To summarize, I expect that, compared to when management aligns with the majority of
investors, when management aligns with the minority, investors will make even more positive
investment decision if management’s final decision is consistent with their own vote and make
even more negative investment decision if management’s final decision is inconsistent with their
own vote. I also expect that the consistency between management’s final decision and investors’
own vote influences investors’ sense of affirmation, which in turn leads to positive or negative
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affect toward management. Investors’ affect toward management will then influence their
investment decisions. Although I expect such a serial mediation effect to hold both when
management aligns with the majority of investors and when management aligns with the
minority of investors, I do expect the effect to be stronger when management aligns with the
minority of investors, compared to when management aligns with the majority of investors. I
formally state my hypotheses as follows:
H1: When investors have stronger opinions on voting issues, investors are more likely to
make favorable investment decisions if management’s final decision is consistent
(versus inconsistent) with their own vote, and such an effect is stronger in cases where
management aligns with the vote of minority investors, compared to the cases in
which management aligns with the vote of majority investors.
H2: When investors have stronger opinions on voting issues, investors’ sense of
affirmation and affect toward management will mediate the effect of opinion
consistency on investment decisions.
2.3. Weaker Opinion and Majority Effect
When investors have weaker opinions on the voting issue, I predict that they will react
differently to opinion consistency and management position, compared to when they have
stronger opinions. Specifically, when investors have weaker opinions on voting issues, they will
not perceive their own vote as their extended self-concept and, therefore, will not be defensive
about their voted opinions. Therefore, opinion consistency will not make investors feel affirmed
or disaffirmed by management and, thus, will not lead them to develop positive or negative
affect toward management.
Furthermore, people’s judgments tend to be influenced by others. When they do not have
strong opinions on certain issues, they tend to think the majority holds the right opinion and will
revise their own beliefs accordingly (i.e., majority effect) (Nowak, Szamrej, and Latane, 1990;
Moussaid, Kammer, Analytis, and Neth, 2013). Lorenz and colleagues (2011) find that people
could reconsider their responses to factual questions after having received average or full
10

information of the responses of others. Similarly, when investors have weaker opinions on the
voting issue, if they find out that their vote is the minority and the majority of investors hold the
opposite opinion as they do, they will start to doubt their own vote. Investors are likely to change
their opinion on the voting issue because they think the majority of investors is more likely to be
right (Genschow, Rigoni, and Brass, 2017). Thus, instead of reacting to whether management’s
final decision is consistent with their own vote, investors will care more about whether
management aligns with the majority of investors.
Specifically, when management chooses to align with the majority of investors, investors
will think management has made the right decision and thus perceive management as more
credible. Investors’ positive perception of management’s credibility will then lead them to make
more positive investment decisions. In contrast, when management aligns with the minority of
investors, investors will think management has made the wrong decision and thus perceive
management as less credible. Investors’ negative perceptions of management’s credibility will
then lead them to make more negative investment decisions. I formally state my hypotheses as
follows:
H3: When investors have weaker opinions on voting issues, they will make more positive
investment decisions in cases where management’s final decision on the voting issue
aligns with the vote of the majority of investors, compared to cases in which
management’s final decision aligns with the vote of the minority of investors.
H4: When investors have weaker opinions on voting issues, the effect of management
position on investors’ investment decision will be mediated by investors’ perceptions
of management credibility.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD

3.1. Participants
I use graduate business students to proxy for individual investors. Two hundred and
thirty-two graduate business students at a large university in the United States participate in the
experiment.3 On average, participants have 6.67 years of investing experience, and have taken
3.2 accounting courses and 1.71 finance courses. Most participants report that they have
previously purchased common stock or debt securities (71.6%) or plan to do so in the future
(94%). Prior investment experience and future intention to invest do not significantly impact the
results (p’s > 0.73).4
3.2. Experimental Design
My study was administered using Qualtrics software. The study uses a 2  2  2 betweenparticipants design, manipulating Opinion Consistency as consistent or inconsistent,
Management Position as aligning with the majority or minority of investors, and investors’
Strength of Opinion as stronger or weaker. As current shareholders of the company, participants
are provided with a voting proposal and are asked to vote on it. The voting proposal is
manipulated to cover two different issues. The stronger opinion voting issue is about whether the
company should make an investment to update their supply chain and use only responsibly
sourced minerals. Since the nature of this decision is a tradeoff between the company’s financial
benefits and the company’s social responsibility, individual investors are able to understand this

I obtained approval from the university’s Institutional Research Board (IRB) before conducting the study.
Participants were rewarded with extra credit.
4
All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise specified.
3
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issue and form a strong opinion on it. Most participants support the proposal to sacrifice the
company’s financial benefits for the purpose of social responsibility: 84.3% of participants voted
“For” and 15.7% of participants voted “Against” on this responsible mineral voting issue. The
weaker opinion voting issue is about whether the company should keep purchasing green energy
from power company or build their own on-site solar panels. The advantages of building on-site
solar panels include electricity bill savings in the future and demonstration of the company’s
commitment to sustainability. However, drawbacks of building on-site solar panels include
substantial frontend costs, uncertainty of solar panels’ performance, and potential impact from
regulatory changes. The analysis of advantages versus disadvantages requires professional
financial knowledge that a typical individual investor does not possess. Therefore, individual
investors tend to have weaker opinions on this voting issue and tend to be relatively indifferent:
42.7% of participants voted “For” and 57.3% of participants voted “Against” on the solar panel
voting issue.
Participants are later provided with management’s final decision on the voting issue,
where I manipulate Opinion Consistency. Specifically, when a participant was randomly
assigned to the consistent condition, if the participant voted “For” the proposal, they would later
be informed that management decided to approve the proposal; if the participant voted “Against”
the proposal, they would later be informed that management decided to reject the proposal.
When a participant was assigned to inconsistent condition, if the participant voted “For” the
proposal, they would later be informed that management decided to reject the proposal; if the
participant voted “Against” the proposal, they would be informed that management decided to
approve the proposal.
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In addition to informing participants about management’s final decision, I also provide
participants with voting outcomes where I manipulate Management Position. In the management
aligns with the majority condition, if management’s final decision was to approve the voting
proposal, then the voting outcome would be that the majority of investors (52%) voted “For”,
with 48% voting “Against”; if management’s final decision was to reject the voting proposal,
then the voting outcome would be that the majority of investors (52%) voted “Against”, with
48% voting “For”. In the management aligns with the minority condition, if management’s final
decision was to approve the voting proposal, then the voting outcome would be that the majority
of investors (52%) voted “Against”, with 48% voting “For”; if management’s final decision was
to reject the voting proposal, then the voting outcome would be that the majority of investors
(52%) voted “For”, with 48% voting “Against”.
3.3. Experimental Procedure
Participants are asked to assume the role of a current investor of a company named UTech and informed that they currently own 2000 shares of the company’s stock. They first read
the company’s background information, learning that the company is a large, public company
with its business focused on producing communications and computing related devices.
Participants then read and voted on a voting proposal, where my manipulation of strength of
opinion occurs. Voting “For” indicates that the participant supports the proposal, and voting
“Against” indicates that the participant does not support the proposal. After casting the vote,
participants indicate how strongly they feel about their voted opinion. Then, participants read an
earnings release about the company, and information about management’s decision regarding the
voting proposal as well as the outcome of shareholders’ voting (i.e., the respective percentage of
shareholders voting “For” and “Against”), where I manipulate Opinion Consistency and
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Management Position. Participants then indicate their investment decisions, fill out a postexperiment questionnaire, including measures on self-affirmation, affect, management
credibility, and provide demographic data.
3.4. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest is participants’ decision to increase, maintain, or
decrease their investment in the company. As mentioned above, at the beginning of the
experiment, the participants are informed that they currently own 2000 shares of the company’s
stock, and they have set aside enough money to purchase another 2000 shares of the company’s
stock if they so decide. Participants first answer whether they would like to increase, decrease, or
maintain their investment the company. If the participants indicate they would like to increase or
decrease their investment, there is a follow-up question asking them how many shares they are
going to increase or decrease their investment. The scale is 0 to 2000 shares. I combine these two
questions to create my primary dependent variable, “investment decision”. Specifically, I code
the decision to increase as +1 and the decision to decrease as -1. I then multiply the decision by
the number of shares indicated in the follow-up question to get a variable ranging from -2000 to
+2000. For participants who decide to maintain their shares, their investment decision is coded as
0.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

4.1. Manipulation Checks
To check whether the manipulation of Opinion Consistency is successful, I ask
participants to indicate whether management decides to approve or reject the voting proposal and
93.10% of participants correctly answer the question. To check the manipulation of Management
Position, I ask participants whether management chooses to align with the majority or minority
of investors and 93.97% of participants correctly answer the question. To check the manipulation
of Strength of Opinion, I ask participants how strongly they feel about their voted opinion on a
11-point scale (with “0” indicating “Not Strongly at all” and “10” indicating “Very Strongly”),
and participants have stronger opinions about the responsible mineral proposal compared to the
solar panel proposal (7.75 versus 6.98; p=0.01). These manipulation checks provide support for
my manipulations of the three independent variables.
4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for participants’ decision to increase,
maintain, or decrease their investment in the company for each of the 8 experimental conditions,
with means plotted in Figure 1 (for stronger opinion voting issue) and Figure 2 (for weaker
opinion voting issue). In Table 1, Panel B, I report the results of the three-way ANOVA with
Opinion Consistency, Management Position, and Strength of Opinion as independent variables
and Investment Decision as the dependent variable. My hypotheses do not directly compare the
stronger opinion and weaker opinion voting issues due to the large inherent differences between
them. Instead, the hypotheses focus on specific predictions about the joint effects of Consistency
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and Management Position for stronger opinion voting issues (H1 and H2) and weaker opinion
voting issues (H3 and H4).
[Insert Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2]
4.3. Hypothesis Testing
4.3.1. Test of H1
H1 predicts that, when the voting proposal covers an issue that investors have stronger
opinions on, investors will make more positive investment decisions if management’s final
decision is consistent (versus inconsistent) with their own vote, and such effect is stronger when
management aligns with the minority of investors, compared to when management aligns with
the majority of investors. I test the pattern predicted by H1 using a contrast test with all eight
cells. I assign contrast weights of (1, 2, -1, -2) to stronger opinion conditions and zeros to weaker
opinion conditions. Specifically, for stronger opinion conditions, I assign “1” to the Consistent
and Align with Majority condition, “2” to the Consistent and Align with Minority condition, “-1”
to the Inconsistent and Align with Majority condition, and “-2” to the Inconsistent and Align
with Minority condition. Figure 1 Panel A shows participants’ mean Investment Decision when
the voting proposal covers an issue that investors have stronger opinions on, which provides
support for visual fit of the observed data to the predicted pattern. Also, as reported in Table 1,
panel C, the contrast is significant (p<0.01). Also, residual between-cells variance is insignificant
(p=0.99) and contrast variance residual (𝑞2 ) is 1.70%, indicating that only 1.70% of betweencells variance is unexplained by the contrast. These results support H1. Also, the simple effect of
Opinion Consistency is significant both when management aligns with the majority of investors
(p=0.02) and when management aligns with the minority of investors (p<0.01).
4.3.2. Test of H2
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My H2 predicts that the interactive effect of Opinion Consistency and Management
Position on Investment Decision will be mediated by investors’ sense of affirmation and affect
toward management. I test this hypothesis with a moderated multi-mediator model (Model 83)
process analysis (Hayes, 2017). Within the stronger opinion voting issue conditions, I run a
mediation analysis with Consistency (1 = Consistent, -1 = Inconsistent) as the independent
variable (X), Management Position as the moderator (W), Investment Decision as the dependent
variable (Y), Sense of Affirmation and Affect toward management as the mediating variables (M1
and M2). Confidence intervals are calculated using 5000 bootstrapped samples. Results are
tabulated in Figure 3. I find a significant positive path from Consistent to Sense of Affirmation
(a1 = 0.44, p < 0.01; a2 = 0.89, p < 0.01), a significant positive path from Sense of Affirmation to
Affect (b = 1.42, p < 0.01), and a significant positive path from Affect to Investment Decision (c =
75.35, p = 0.05, one-tailed). After controlling for mediators, direct effect of Consistency on
Investment Decision is insignificant (p=0.54). The indirect effect is significant both when
management aligns with the majority (LLCI: 1.11; ULCI: 100.24) and when management aligns
with the minority of investors (LLCI: 2.50; ULCI: 195.42), as both confidence intervals exclude
zero. These results are consistent with my expectation that when management’s final decision on
the voting issue is consistent with investors’ own vote, investors feel more affirmed and thus
develop positive affect toward management, which then leads them to make more positive
investment decisions, compared to when management’s final decision is inconsistent with
investors’ own vote. I also find that the moderated mediation index is significant (-47.38, 95% of
bootstrapped estimates are less than -0.07), suggesting the indirect effect through Sense of
Affirmation and Affect is stronger when management aligns with the minority of investors,
compared to when management aligns with the majority of investors. These results support H2.
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[Insert Figure 3]
4.3.3. Test of H3
H3 predicts that when investors have weaker opinions on the voting issue, they will make
more positive investment decisions when management aligns with the majority of investors,
compared to when management aligns with the minority of investors, regardless of whether
management’s final decision is consistent with their own vote. I test the main effect of
Management Position predicted by H3 using a contrast test with all eight cells. I assign contrast
weights of (1, -1, 1, -1) to weaker opinion conditions and zero to stronger opinion conditions.
Specifically, for weaker opinion conditions, I assign “1” to the Consistent and Align with
Majority condition, “-1” to the Consistent and Align with Minority condition, “1” to the
Inconsistent and Align with Majority condition, and “-1” to the Inconsistent and Align with
Minority condition. Figure 1 Panel B shows participants’ mean Investment Decision when the
voting proposal covers an issue that investors have weaker opinions on, which provides support
for visual fit of the observed data to the predicted pattern. As tabulated in Table 1, Panel D, the
contrast is significant (p=0.03, one-tailed).5 Residual between-cells variance is insignificant
(p=0.96) and contrast variance residual (𝑞2 ) is 30.25%. The results support H3 that investors
make more positive investment decisions when management aligns with the majority of
investors, compared to when management aligns with the minority of investors.
4.3.4. Test of H4
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the main effect of Management Position on Investment
Decision will be mediated by investors’ perception of management credibility. I test this

I also ran a 2  2 ANOVA with Opinion Consistency and Management Position as the independent variables, and
Investment Decisions as the dependent variable, analyzing the subsample of weak opinion voting issue. The main
effect of management position is significant (p=0.05) and all other effects are insignificant (p-values > 0.25).
5
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hypothesis with a mediator model (Model 4) process analysis (Hayes, 2017). Within the weaker
opinion voting issue conditions, I run a mediation analysis with Management Position (1 = Align
with Majority, -1 = Align with Minority) as the independent variable (X), Investment Decision as
the dependent variable (Y), and Management Credibility as the mediating variable (M).
Confidence intervals are calculated using 5000 bootstrapped samples. Results are tabulated in
Figure 4. I find a significant positive path from Management Position to Management Credibility
(a = 0.26, p < 0.01), and a significant positive path from Management Credibility to Investment
Decision (b = 251.30, p < 0.01). That is to say, the indirect effect through Management
Credibility is significant (65.47, LLCI: 17.33; ULCI: 128.36), as the confidence interval
excludes zero. After controlling for the mediator, the direct effect of Management Position on
Investment Decision is insignificant (p=0.294). These results support my expectation that when
management’s final decision aligns with the majority of investors, investors will perceive
management as more credible, and such a perception of high management credibility leads
investors to make more positive investment decisions, compared to when management’s final
decision aligns with the minority of investors. These results support H4.
[Insert Figure 4]
4.4. Additional Analysis
While the results of the experiment support my hypotheses, there could be alternative
explanations for the effect of Opinion Consistency and Management Position on individual
investors’ investment decisions. First, it is possible that when individual investors have stronger
opinions on a voting issue, Opinion Consistency can influence their perception of management
credibility. When management’s final decision is consistent with investors’ own vote, investors
may perceive management as more credible and, when management’s final decision is
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inconsistent with their own vote, investors may perceive management as less credible. Investors’
perceptions of management credibility can then influence their investment decisions.
Another alternative explanation for the effect of Opinion Consistency on investment
decision is that investors could feel they have more control over the decision-making process
regarding the voting issue when management’s final decision is consistent with their own vote
compared to when management’s final decision is inconsistent with their own vote, and a
stronger feeling of control can lead them to make more positive investment decisions. In the
post-experimental questionnaire, I measure participants’ sense of control over the decisionmaking process regarding the voting issue on a 11-point scale (with “0” indicating “No Control
at all” and “10” indicating “Complete Control”).
Also, management’s final decision as well as other investors’ vote can affect the extent to
which an investor feels like part of the company. Stronger feeling of being part of the company
can lead investors to make more positive investment decisions and weaker feeling of being part
of the company can lead investors to make more negative investment decisions. In the postexperimental questionnaire, I ask participants the extent to which they agree with the statement
that they see themselves as part of the company on a 11-point scale (with “-5” indicating
“Strongly Disagree” and “5” indicating “Strongly Agree”).
To exclude the alternative explanations discussed above, for the stronger opinion voting
issue, I run mediation analyses with Opinion Consistency as the independent variable,
Management Position as the moderator, Investment Decision as the dependent variable, and
affect, perception of management credibility, sense of control, and feeling of being part of the
company as parallel mediators. Results show that perception of management credibility does not
mediate the effect of Opinion Consistency on Investment Decision either when management
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aligns with the majority of investors (LLCI: -114.21; ULCI: 63.29) or when management aligns
with the minority of investors (LLCI: -201.13; ULCI: 118.93); sense of control does not mediate
the effect of Opinion Consistency on Investment Decision either when management aligns with
the majority of investors (LLCI: -40.89; ULCI: 144.55) or when management aligns with the
minority of investors (LLCI: -50.16; ULCI: 217.21); and feeling of being part of the company
does not mediate the effect of Opinion Consistency on Investment Decision either when
management aligns with the majority of investors (LLCI: -56.30; ULCI: 88.03) or when
management aligns with the minority of investors (LLCI: -76.56; ULCI: 158.10). Therefore,
investors’ perception of management credibility, sense of control over the decision-making
process, and feeling of being part of the company do not explain the relationship between
Opinion Consistency and investors’ investment decisions.
For the weaker opinion voting issue, I run mediation analyses with Management Position
as the independent variable, Investment Decision as the dependent variable, and perception of
management credibility and feeling as part of the company as parallel mediators. Results suggest
that feeling as part of the company does not mediate the effect of Management Position on
Investment Decision (LLCI: -29.60; ULCI: 64.90). Therefore, the alternative explanation that the
effect of Management Position on individual investors’ investment decisions is mediated through
investors’ feeling as part of the company is excluded.
In the main analysis, I investigate the joint effect of Opinion Consistency and
Management Position within each voting issue. While I manipulated the responsible minerals
voting issue to elicit stronger opinions from investors and manipulated the on-site solar panel
voting issue to elicit weaker opinions, it is possible that investors’ perceptions of the two voting
issues are not completely in line with my manipulation. Therefore, instead of using responsible
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minerals as the stronger opinion voting issue and on-site solar panel as the weaker opinion voting
issue, I combine the responses of both voting issues and median split the measured strength of
opinion into stronger versus weaker opinion conditions. Then within the measured stronger
opinion group and weaker opinion group, I run a 2  2 ANOVA with Opinion Consistency and
Management Position as the independent variables and investment decision as the dependent
variable. In the measured stronger opinion group, the main effect of Opinion Consistency
(p<0.01) and the main effect of Management Position (p=0.07) are both significant. The
interaction between the two independent variables is insignificant (p=0.16). Specifically,
investors make more positive investment decisions when management’s final decision on the
voting issue is consistent (versus inconsistent) with their own vote and when management aligns
with the majority (versus minority) of investors. In the measured weaker opinion group, the main
effect of Opinion Consistency is marginally significant (p=0.06, one-tailed), with investors
making more positive investment decisions when management’s final decision is consistent
(versus inconsistent) with their own vote. The main effect of Management Position (p=0.64) and
the interaction between the two independent variables (p=0.77) are insignificant.
The different results in the measured versus manipulated stronger and weaker opinion
conditions could be because the measurement of participants’ strength of opinion does not
accurately capture how strong participants’ opinions actually are.6 It is also possible that there
are differences other than strength of opinion between the two voting issues and these differences
are causing investors to have different reactions to management’s final decision on the voting
issue. Such differences can be investors’ confidence in their own opinions and whether the
voting issue is more about moral values or business operations.

6

The question measuring participants’ strength of opinion is “how strongly do you feel about your voted opinion?”
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Considering the important role of individual investors on the stock market and the
increasingly common trend for companies to hold nonbinding shareholder votes on different
issues, this study investigates whether and how participation in shareholder voting affects
individual investors’ investment decisions. In an experiment with graduate business students, I
find that when investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, the consistent (inconsistent)
opinion between individual investors’ own vote and management’s final decision makes
investors feel affirmed (disaffirmed) and leads them to develop positive (negative) affect toward
management, which in turn influences their investment decisions. Also, this effect is stronger
when management aligns with the minority of investors compared to when management aligns
with the majority of investors. In contrast, when investors have weaker opinions on the voting
issue, the consistency between management’s final decision and investors’ own vote does not
affect investors’ investment decisions. Instead, whether management aligns with the majority or
minority of investors influences individual investors’ investment decisions. That is, when
investors have weaker opinions, they tend to think the majority of investors are more likely to be
right and thus perceive management as more credible when management’s final decision aligns
with the majority (versus minority) of investors. Investor’s perception of management’s
credibility then leads them to make more positive or more negative investment decisions.
This study contributes to the literature on shareholder voting by examining how
participating in shareholder voting affects individual investors’ judgments and decisions. Also,
by applying ego-defensiveness theory and the majority effect in an accounting setting, I establish
a theoretical mechanism to provide insights as to why shareholder voting affects individual

24

investors differently when investors have stronger versus weaker opinions. My results suggest
that when investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, the consistency between their
own vote and management’s final decision will lead them to develop positive or negative affect
toward management. Individual investors’ affect toward management will then lead them to
make emotional investment decisions, which is not a desirable investing behavior. Regulators
should be aware of the effects of shareholder voting on individual investors, as there could be
unintended consequences of promoting shareholder voting among individual investors.
My findings are also informative to company management. Since it is now common for
companies to hold nonbinding shareholder voting on different issues, it is important for
management to understand that their final decisions on voting issues, whether to go with
majority or minority, could have an impact on investors’ investment decisions. Importantly,
depending on whether investors have stronger or weaker opinions on voting issues,
management’s final decisions could have different effects on investors’ judgments. Specifically,
in cases where investors have stronger opinions on the voting issue, if management’s final
decision on the issue is consistent with their own vote, investors make directionally more
positive investment decisions when management aligns with the minority of investors. But if
management’s final decision on the voting issue is inconsistent with investors’ own vote,
investors make directionally more negative investment decisions when management aligns with
the minority of investors. That is, when investors have strong opinions on the voting issue, the
valence of management position effect can be moderated by the opinion consistency between
management and investors. However, in cases where investors have weaker opinions on the
voting issue, investors make more positive investment decisions when management aligns with
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the majority of investors versus the minority of investors, regardless of whether management’s
final decision is consistent with the investors’ own votes.
In addition, my findings can help make individual investors aware that they could be
prone to make emotional investment decisions when they participate in the company’s
shareholder voting. Since participation in shareholder voting has the potential to make investors
with stronger opinions more emotional in making investment decisions, individual investors
should be aware of this and try to take action to avoid being influenced by their voting
experience. For example, they could postpone making investment decisions after being informed
about the voting outcome and management’s final decision on the voting issue.
My study is not without limitations. First, my experiment only simulates a setting in
which individual investors vote online. The effects of voting may be different when investors
vote by mailing in their filled-out proxy card. It is possible that the effect of opinion consistency
will be stronger when investors vote by mail compared to voting online because this would
involve greater effort in the voting process and, thus, they may care more about whether
management’s final decision is consistent with their own vote. Future research can examine
whether different voting methods (e.g., vote online, mail in proxy card, attend shareholder
meeting) lead to different reactions from individual investors.
In addition, as discussed above, there can be differences other than strength of opinion
between the two voting issues and these differences can potentially cause investors to react
differently to Opinion Consistency and Management Position. Also, if these differences do cause
investors’ different reactions to management’s final decision on the voting issue, then there can
also be other underlying mechanisms that explain the effects of Opinion Consistency and
Management Position on individual investors’ investment decisions. For example, the joint
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effect of Opinion Consistency and Management Position on individual investors’ investment
decisions may be mediated by how justified or reasonable they perceive management’s final
decision to be. Future research can further investigate how individual investors react differently
to different types of voting issues as well as related underlying mechanisms.
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Figure 1 Panel A: Results for Stronger Opinion Voting Issue
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Figure 1 Panel B: Results for Weaker Opinion Voting Issue
Investment Decision when Voting Opinion is
Weaker
400
200

370.8

291.4

174.9

0
-54.6

-200

-400
-600

Consistent

Inconsistent

Align with Majority

Align with Minority

Participants’ Investment Decision is captured on a scale from “decrease investment by 2000 shares” to “increase investment
by 2000 shares”.
Stronger opinion voting issue is about whether the company should update their supply chain to responsible minerals only.
Weaker opinion voting issue is about whether the company should keep purchasing green energy from power company or
build their own on-site solar panels.
Align with majority means management’s final decision on the voting issue aligns with the vote of majority (52%) investors.
Align with minority means management’s final decision on the voting issue aligns with the vote of minority (48%) investors.
Consistent means management’s final decision on the voting issue is consistent with an investor’s own vote.
Inconsistent means management’s final decision on the voting issue is inconsistent with an investor’s own vote.
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Figure 2 Panel A: Results with Confidence Interval for Stronger Opinion Voting Issue

Figure 2 Panel B: Results with Confidence Interval for Weaker Opinion Voting Issue

Participants’ Investment Decision is captured on a scale from “decrease investment by 2000 shares” to “increase investment
by 2000 shares”.
Stronger opinion voting issue is about whether the company should update their supply chain to responsible minerals only.
Weaker opinion voting issue is about whether the company should keep purchasing green energy from power company or
build their own on-site solar panels.
Align with majority means management’s final decision on the voting issue aligns with the vote of majority (52%) investors.
Align with minority means management’s final decision on the voting issue aligns with the vote of minority (48%) investors.
Consistent means management’s final decision on the voting issue is consistent with an investor’s own vote.
Inconsistent means management’s final decision on the voting issue is inconsistent with an investor’s own vote.
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Figure 3: Mediation Analysis for Stronger Opinion Voting Issue: H2
Align with Majority:
a1 = 0.44, p < 0.01
Align with Minority:
a2 = 0.89, p < 0.01

Sense of
Affirmation

b = 1.42,
p < 0.01

Affect toward
Management

Consistency
Direct effect
(after controlling for mediators)
d’ = 68.59, p = 0.54

Path
a1 × b × c
a2 × b × c

Indirect
Effect
47.35
94.73

Bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval
95% of bootstrapped estimates > 1.11
95% of bootstrapped estimates > 2.50

c = 75.35, p = 0.05𝑎

Investment Decision

Test Result
Significant (Entire 95% CI > 0)
Significant (Entire 95% CI > 0)

Indices of Moderated Mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):
Moderated Mediation is Significant
Index = -47.38
95% of bootstrapped estimates < -0.67
(Entire 95% CI < 0)
𝑎𝑝 -value is one-tailed due to the directional prediction of H2.
Figure 3 illustrates the mediation analysis for participants assigned to stronger opinion voting issue conditions, with Consistency
between management’s final decision and investor’s own vote (“1” for consistent and “-1” for inconsistent) as the independent
variable, Management Position as the moderator, Investment Decision as the dependent variable, and Sense of Affirmation and
Affect toward Management as the mediating variables. We estimate the path coefficients through 5000 bootstrapped samples with
a 95% confidence level (one-tailed, given our directional predictions (see Hayes, 2018)). We capture participants’ perceptions of
Sense of Affirmation by asking them to what extent they “feel affirmed by management”, “feel appreciated by management”,
“feel respected by management”, and “management values my opinion”, all measured on scales from “-5” to “5” where “-5” is
labelled “Strongly Disagree” and “5” is labelled “Strongly Agree”. The four measures are highly correlated (all Pearson
Correlations > 0.70, p < 0.01), thus I load these four items to form a single measure of Sense of Affirmation. Affect toward
Management is measured by asking participants to what extent they feel “satisfied”, “pleased”, “happy”, “disappointed”,
“frustrated”, and “angry” with management, all measured on scales from “-5” to “5” where “-5” is labelled “Strongly Disagree”
and “5” is labelled “Strongly Agree”. The first three measures capture positive affect and the last three measures capture negative
affect. The six measures are highly correlated (all Pearson Correlations absolute value > 0.78, p < 0.01), thus I average these six
items (with the coefficient of first three measures as “1” and coefficient of last three measures as “-1”) to form a single measure
of Affect toward Management. All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted.
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Figure 4: Mediation Analysis for Weaker Opinion Voting Issue: H4

Management
Credibility

b = 251.30, p < 0.01

a = 0.26, p < 0.01

Management Position

Investment Decision
Direct Effect
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Path
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65.47

Bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval
Lower: 17.33; Higher: 128.36

Test Result
Significant (Entire 95% CI > 0)

*The interaction between Management Position and Consistency on Management Credibility is insignificant (p=0.74). The effect
of Management Position on Management Credibility is not moderated by Consistency. Therefore, to analyze the mediation for
weaker opinion voting issue, I use Hayes’ Model 4.
Figure 4 illustrates the mediation analysis for participants assigned to weaker opinion voting issue conditions, with Management
Position (“1” for align with majority and “-1” for align with minority) as the independent variable, Investment Decision as the
dependent variable, and Management Credibility as the mediating variable. We estimate the path coefficients through 5000
bootstrapped samples with a 95% confidence level. We capture participants’ perceptions of Management Credibility by asking
them to what extent they feel management is “competent” and “trustworthy”, both measured on scales from “-5” to “5” where “5” is labelled “Strongly Disagree” and “5” is labelled “Strongly Agree”. These two measures are highly correlated (Pearson
Correlations = 0.79, p < 0.01), thus I load these two items to form a single measure of Management Credibility. All p-values are
two-tailed.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM FOR EXPERIMENT
You are being invited to participate in a research study titled “Investor Judgments”. This study is
being conducted by Chris Agoglia, Yushi Tian, and Elaine Wang from the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. You were selected to participate in this study because of your
educational background.
Why are we doing this research study?
The purpose of this research study is to learn about how people make judgments about a
company’s financial performance.
Who can participate in this research study?
Graduate business students are qualified for this study.
What will I be asked to do and how much time will it take?
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete an online survey. This survey
will ask about investment judgments and it will take you approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Will being in this research study help me in any way?
You may not directly benefit from the findings of this research; however, we hope that your
participation in the study will help management of firms to better understand decision-making
behaviors of investors, as well as help individual investors to gain a better knowledge of their
own behaviors as a group.
What are my risks of being in this research study?
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this study other than those encountered
in daily online computer use. The risk of breach of confidentiality always exists. But we have
taken the steps to minimize this risk as outlined below.
How will my personal information be protected?
To the best of our ability, your answers in this study will remain confidential. We will minimize
any risks by keeping the data in a password-protected laptop. Your answers will be analyzed
after being aggregated with responses from other respondents. Your name and student ID will
only be used to record your extra credit. Your name and student ID information will be kept 2 to
3 weeks after the close of the study.
Will I be given any money or other compensation for being in this research study?
You will get extra credit after you complete the survey. To make sure you carefully attend to
the information, we have embedded attention check questions in the middle of the
survey. If you fail to pass the attention check questions, you may not get the extra credit.
What happens if I say yes, but I change my mind later?
You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to. If you agree to be in the study, but later
change your mind, you may drop out at any time. There are no penalties or consequences of any
kind if you decide that you do not want to participate.
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Who can I talk to if I have questions?
If you have questions about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may
contact the researchers, Yushi Tian at yushitian@umass.edu, Chris Agoglia at
cpa22@isenberg.umass.edu, or Elaine Wang at ewang@isenberg.umass.edu. If you have any
questions concerning your rights as a research subject, you may contact the University of
Massachusetts Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at (413) 545-3428 or
humansubjects@ora.umass.edu.
By clicking “I agree” below you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old, have read this
consent form, and agree to participate in this research study.
I agree

I do not agree
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL CASE
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Exhibit 1
Instructions
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Exhibit 2
Financial Data
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Exhibit 3.1
Voting Proposal & Vote Casting – Solar Panel

Please indicate your vote below:
For
Against
Thank you for your vote. Management will disclose the outcome of the voting after it is closed.
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Exhibit 3.2
Voting Proposal &Vote Casting – Responsible Minerals

Please indicate your vote below:
For
Against
Thank you for your vote. Management will disclose the outcome of the voting after it is closed.
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Exhibit 4
Strength of Opinion Measurement
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Exhibit 5
Additional Financial Data
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Exhibit 6
Manipulation of Voting Outcome and Management Decision
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Exhibit 6.1a
Solar Panel – For – Consistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.1b
Solar Panel – For – Consistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.1c
Solar Panel – For – Inconsistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.1d
Solar Panel – For – Inconsistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.1e
Solar Panel – Against – Consistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.1f
Solar Panel – Against – Consistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.1g
Solar Panel – Against – Inconsistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.1h
Solar Panel – Against – Inconsistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.2a
Responsible Minerals – For – Consistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.2b
Responsible Minerals – For – Consistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.2c
Responsible Minerals – For – Inconsistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.2d
Responsible Minerals – For – Inconsistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.2e
Responsible Minerals – Against – Consistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.2f
Responsible Minerals – Against – Consistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 6.2g
Responsible Minerals – Against – Inconsistent & Aligns with Majority
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Exhibit 6.2h
Responsible Minerals – Against – Inconsistent & Aligns with Minority
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Exhibit 7 part a
Dependent Variable – Investment Decision
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Exhibit 7 part b
Dependent Variable – Investment Decision
*Question b will only be displayed if the participant chooses “Increase” or “Decrease” in question a
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Exhibit 8
Affect
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Exhibit 9
Sense of Affirmation & Additional PEQs
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Exhibit 10
Management Credibility & Additional PEQs
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Exhibit 11
Attribution of Financial Loss
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Exhibit 12
Manipulation Checks
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Exhibit 13
Likelihood to Participate in The Vote
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Exhibit 14
Self Esteem

68

Exhibit 15
Demographics
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